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665 178 191 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers, technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 ● 423 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 474 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

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against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423 474
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political
organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their
connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the
yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been
tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the
extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in
Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating
them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the
Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be
functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the
growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against
Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were
bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national'
grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the
Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through
their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry
and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Re-
gardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding
years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians
belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk
negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were
accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They
were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which
suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves
living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.)
declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the
part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial,
Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's
Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of
other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or
the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in
Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated
himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long
time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the *kolkhozy*. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

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kolkhozy covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determination and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign correspondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

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§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

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had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*.

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside:

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms);
(*b*) Individual farms;
(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);
(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

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kolkhozniki were reckoned to be even richer in pigs, of which they counted 15 million against 5 million on the *Kolkhozy* and an even lesser number on the *Sovkhozy*. The tiny bits of land which belong to the *kolkhozniki* personally, as well as their domestic animals, have become a school of individual farming which has grown up in the middle of 'the Socialist experiment' as a compromise with the dictates of economics and human nature. In twenty-eight towns in 1938, 82 per cent rye flour, 74 per cent wheat flour, 86 per cent beef, 93 per cent milk, 97 per cent eggs, 87 per cent potatoes, and 72 per cent cabbages, were brought to market by *kolkhozniki* and individual farmers, and only the balance came from the state and collective farms. True the official statisticians could find comfort in the fact that as against the general balance of state commerce which amounted to 100 milliards of roubles the free market only absorbed 16 milliards: but the free market shows a definite tendency to grow and in four years has doubled its transactions.

The successful private initiative of the *kolkhozniki* has already begun to weigh upon the minds of the protagonists of the integral Revolution. In the spring of 1938 a Government Decree proclaimed that 'abuses are observed on those allotments of land which are given over to *kolkhozniki* for the personal cultivation of kitchen-gardens or other domestic needs. These abuses consist in the fact that the allotments are sometimes not situated next to the habitations of the *kolkhozniki*, but lie in the middle of *Kolkhoz* lands and exceed the size allowed by the law. The worst part of it all is that these allotments have become the principal care of *kolkhozniki*, and that they show negligence in the accomplishment of their duties in collective farming. It has also been affirmed that these allotments are sometimes cultivated by people who are not members of *Kolkhozy*. A stop has to be put to this state of things as it leads to the development of bourgeois tendencies. The dangerous influence of *kulaki*, who have succeeded in escaping, is suspected.' As a result of this situation, Stalin, by a Decree of 15 August 1939, ordered a 'verification' of all allotments taken over by *kolkhozniki* for personal cultivation: he took the opportunity to recall the law which provided that such allotments were not to exceed ¼ or ½ a hectare. It was also declared that all allotments in isolated situations in the middle of *Kolkhoz* land were illegal and should be abolished: special attention was directed to *Kolkhozy* lying in the Ukraine and Western Russia. *Kolkhozniki*, whose individual allotments were to be abolished, were themselves to be expelled from their *Kolkhozy* and united in new *Kolkhozy* in regions where 'new land' could be found. For this purpose attention was directed to the lands beyond the Volga, in

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western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

The Background of the Communist Triumph

Let us, therefore, look briefly at 175
the outstanding elements of the situation as they were at the beginning of the revolution.

From the time of the organization and Christianization of the Kievan state at the end of the tenth century to the eighteenth century, Ukraine, whether independent, or subject to Poland-Lithuania, or to the Russian Tsars, had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775 Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich, the centre of the Ukrainian Kozaks, and in 1783 she abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time the area was divided into *gubernias* as the rest of the Russian Empire and the full Russian methods of administration were introduced.

From that moment, too, the Russian government spared no efforts to destroy every vestige of Ukrainian national and cultural consciousness. The Ukrainian language was treated as a peasant dialect of Russian; the name Ukraine was forbidden and even the substitute Little Russia was treated as a generic term for the area north of the Black Sea, but it did not figure on the political map of the Russian Empire as a distinct entity. The Ukrainian revival in the nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Kotlyarevsky's parody of the *Aeneid* in 1798 was confined to the [536] cultural sphere and could offer little or nothing in the way of administrative experience to the Ukrainian people. Those Ukrainians who entered the Russian service were usually sent to distant areas, while the administrative personnel in Ukraine was chiefly Russian in origin and feeling.

The great estates were largely owned by Russians or by Poles 186
and even many Ukrainian landowners who had succeeded in retaining their holdings were so thoroughly Russianized that they [423] felt little sense of kinship with the peasants on their estates. Ukrainian life was lived chiefly in the villages. The Ukrainian language was not taught in the schools or used in the courts, for all education and administration were in the Russian language. Still the peasants continued their own manner of living with their own traditions and their own tastes and desires.

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423 ●
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation[1] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 369 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities. Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

651 661 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production[1] for the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

[1] [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21 - Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

assumed that it was equally binding in Ukraine and without any further ado, the Ukrainian peasants were given the right of selling any surplus products exactly as if there had been no independent Ukrainian Soviet government.

The legal aspects of this decree did not interest the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants. They saw only the relief which it afforded them and the opportunities that it gave. They immediately took advantage of it, and its first effects were to be seen in a surprisingly short time. Of course, there could be no improvement in the national well-being until the harvest and the harvest of 1921 was again reduced by drought, so that with the best of intentions, it was not until 1922 that conditions began to improve.

A new Russian land code was finally adopted on March 3, 1921, and it was, of course, the model to be observed in the Ukraine. Yet this did not suppress the discontent of the Ukrainian peasants.

In an effort to suppress this smouldering discontent, D. Manuilsky, who was then the Commissar for Agriculture of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (the revolutionary centre and the provisional government of the country), summoned to Kharkiv a gathering of agronomists from all parts of Ukraine in the First All-Ukrainian Agronomical Congress. He found the more than one thousand present practically united in their assertions that the agricultural laws as developed by the Bolsheviks were inapplicable to the Ukraine. They had been drawn up and approved on March 6, 1919 and they were entirely based on the spirit of the Russian land commune which provided usually for a redistribution of the land every three years, with the supplemental provision that the redistribution should take into account the number of persons in each family. This was all very good when it agreed, as it did in Russia, with the general spirit of the people who were vitally interested in the commune as such. Conditions were different in Ukraine and the purely artificial Land Society was developed. Of course, all the peasants had to become members but the land was divided by households rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, it was provided in the Ukrainian Code that "The right to land handed over for labor use is without term and

● 423 671 can be taken away only in accordance with the provisions of the law." This insured the individual household in possession of its own piece of land and made it possible for the more industrious to undertake the improvement of the soil.

By the time that the final form of the Labor Code was established on November 22, 1922, it had become almost essentially different from the Russian Code, although it paid a lip service to the principle of nationalization through the actions of the Land Societies. A further sign of submission was the establishment of maximums on landholding. No household in the densely settled areas could have more than fourteen hectares or, in the less thickly populated areas, forty-eight hectares. The Land Society had the right to decide on the form of exploitation of the land to be carried out but if a family disagreed with the form established, it was entitled to demand the same amount of land but not necessarily the same land that it had contributed. Furthermore, outside of the requirement that all members of household were compelled to labor personally on the land, the provisions dealing with hired labor and the renting of land were left purposely vague or were omitted for further study.

The new code, which was more liberal than that in Russia, was devised in the interests of the landless peasants and also the poor and middle peasants, and definitely ratified the seizure of the estates of the large landowners. Sixty-eight per cent of the landless peasants received small tracts of land and fifty-two percent of those with holdings from two to four hectares were settled under more favorable conditions, or received additional land. On the other hand, 27.2% of those with more than sixteen hectares, the normal holding, and 56.8% of those with more than twenty-five hectares, saw their additional land removed and handed over to their less fortunate neighbors. In a sense this might seem to have been a solution of the crying need of the peasants for land but it brought with it some unexpected results.

423 427 The civil war had completely destroyed any free capital, and without capital the peasants could not buy the tools, the fertilizers, etc., which they needed to prosper. This made little difference in

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor.

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before.

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these years of reconstruction[1] to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine.

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended.

[1] [During NEP -- Analyst]

The Five Year Plan

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout [475] the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1] 423 474 661 425

1 A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the
474 compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land
661 was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced
425 into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

[423] The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collective system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

651 whether or not that peasant was raising hens. The government demanded its share of the manure from the private cattle and it made no difference as to whether or not the individual raised cattle.

423 685 At the same time the heads of the Communist Party sought high and wide for misuse of state property. Again and again they discovered that on collective farms the administration and the peasants were in agreement that the best way to allow some improvement in the general economic situation was to permit the peasant to cultivate and have the income from a slightly larger plot of land. The increased productivity in this way often more than covered the apparent use of state income from the operations of the farm but to the leaders of the Communist Party this was as severe an offence as was the failure to fulfil obligations, for it dared to question the superiority of the policy of collectivization. During 1939, the Party made strenuous efforts to stop such abuses and they even went further in urging and commanding a reduction in the individual allotments of land, which had been the only means of winning even a grudging approval of the Ukrainian peasants for the idea of collectivization.

Of course, with the outbreak of World War II there came a slight relaxation of this pressure, for Stalin and his friends apparently became aware that an excessive attack upon the peasantry might lead them to make common cause with the opponents of the Soviet Union. Yet, this relaxation of pressure was very slight during the years 1939-1941, when the alliance of Stalin and Hitler seemed to be firm and steady and when the Soviet Union was expanding in accordance with its own powers and its own intrigues. In all this the Ukraine remained aloof, closely guarded against the importation of new ideas and the population dragged on their weary existence, scarcely daring to dream that anything could happen to change their unhappy lot.

[1939 -- Analyst]

At the same time the nationalization of the land was commenced and this gave a good excuse for the elimination of another class of formerly prosperous people, whether they were Poles or Ukrainians. At first this was carried out along the lines of the Ukrainian land code of 1922, for the authorities were eager to get crops in when spring came. Still, during the summer of 1940 they began to urge the formation of collective farms. The peasants in some of the more backward regions listened to these ideas willingly, but in the better areas where agriculture was on a far higher and more efficient plane than in large sections of eastern Ukraine, they were very cool and meetings had to be postponed again and again if disorders were to be averted in the middle of the war. Still the Soviet authorities felt that they could waste some time until a real peace was restored and their hands were definitely free.

In regard to the educational establishments and all questions of organization, they acted without delay. In the first days of the occupation, the Soviet commissars seized the property of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and prevented all further work by confiscating the building and its contents and preventing all further publications. On January 14, 1940, they forced the complete self-liquidation of the Society. The president, Prof. Rakovsky, at once fled to the west and during the next uncertain months a large part of the active members made their way to Krakow in the Polish Government General, where they endeavored to resume their work. The Society was then turned into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and was placed under the control of the administration in Kiev, while part of its collections and its work was placed under the University of Lviv, which was now ostensibly Ukrainianized and given the name of Ivan Franko, the great Western Ukrainian scholar and writer. This was not for long, for very soon here, too, the lecturers to win Soviet approval began to switch over from Ukrainian to Russian.

All other societies of every kind were abolished and fitted into the Soviet scheme of things. The cooperative network, especially such great societies as the Maslosoyuz (Dairy Cooperative Society) and the People's Trade were made governmental organs. Various

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II.

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such developments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the permanent links which had developed to the point where they threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively.

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the

creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighborhood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

accused of having belonged to a subversive League for the Liberation of the Ukraine.[24] That this campaign of suppression coincided with the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine is hardly coincidental. In many respects the Ukrainian peasant was much more profoundly affected by the establishment of the kolkhoz (Ukrainian *kolhosp*), or collective farm, than was the Russian. The former was frequently more prosperous, hence had more to lose; moreover, the lack of a traditional communal agricultural organization in the Ukraine made the new system more alien and repugnant.

It appears certain that the Ukrainian peasantry formed a disproportionate, if not predominant, part of the hapless millions deported as "kulaks" to Siberia or Kazakhstan or driven by famine to the primitive slums of the expanding Soviet cities. Very probably this situation created a potential basis for a national rebellion based on economic and social oppression by alien rulers, just as had the Polish and Russian preponderance in governmental and landowning groups before the war. The Communists were frequently forced to use non-Ukrainians, Russian and Jewish intellectuals, workers from the towns, where they had real support, or persons imported from Russia itself, in order to carry out collectivization. Consequently, it is probable that the suppression of the nationalist intelligentsia at this time was at least in part a precautionary step to destroy a group which was of limited danger in itself yet might have presented a real threat to the Communists if it could have utilized the discontent of the peasants to turn them to nationalism. To what extent the Soviet regime succeeded in eliminating the nationalist intellectuals is one of the principal topics which will be dealt with on the basis of the evidence provided in this study. It should be noted at this point,

[24] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166; T. Skubyts'kyi, "Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature" (The Class Struggle in Ukrainian Historical Literature), *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 17 (1930), pp. 27–40 (one of the principal Communist assaults on the Hrushevs'kyi school and other "deviationists"). The whole question of the purge of intellectuals, with special reference to historians, is discussed at length by Boris Krupnyts'kyi in "Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921–1941," in *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1941, pp. 125–51. For Skrypnyk's official statement, see his *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches) (Kharkov: Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo Ukraïny, 1930), Vol. I: *Spil'ka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny* (The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), pp. 413–36.

ments of the Galician population—teachers, physicians, artists—were brought to Kiev to participate in Ukrainian cultural activities.[70]

After a comparatively short time, however, the Soviet administration appears to have become convinced that this "generous" treatment of Ukrainian national aspirations was unrewarding. About the middle of 1940, the Ukrainian occupation troops, which had evidently been on too friendly terms with the local population, were withdrawn and replaced by units recruited in Central Asia.[71] A strip along the border with the Generalgouvernement was cleared of its population to a depth of several miles, and crossing was made almost impossible.[72] A start was made in the collectivization of agriculture.[73] No less important than these deliberate measures perhaps was the sending of tens of thousands of "carpetbagger" Soviet state, party, and army officials to the West Ukraine, where by their alien aspect (many were Russian) and their sheer numbers they severely irritated the local population.[74]

While it is impossible to know what the Soviet motives for introducing a harsher policy were, one may guess that the negative reaction of the population to the "tolerant" epoch played a part. The Soviet authorities probably discovered soon that the student exchanges had an effect opposite to that intended, for the West Ukrainian students were disagreeably surprised by the material

[70] Arthur W. Just, in *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5.

[71] Mykhailo Kohut, "Iak zhylo halyts'ke selo pid bol'shevykamy" (How a Galician Village Lived under the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Report of interview with Dr. H. J. Beyer (a German official who had been active in Galicia), *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, July 16, 1941, p. 3.

[72] *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 10, 1940, p. 3, based on an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[73] Kohut in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 25, 1941, p. 2, and May 17, 1942, p. 4.

[74] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 13, 1942, p. 4, states that, due to the influx of Polish refugees from the German military campaign and the arrival of Soviet officials, the population of L'vov increased from 318,000 to 450,000 under Soviet occupation. On August 14, 1941, it printed a letter from L'vov stating that Soviet officials and their families in L'vov had numbered 100,000. Just (*Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5) concludes from the number of votes cast in the Soviet election in Stanislav in the summer of 1940 that the population of that city must have increased by over 40,000, 1,000 of whom, he says, were NKVD officers.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

one of the camps put it.[58] As colder weather approached, typhus combined with starvation to bring about hundreds of thousands of deaths.

Since many of these camps were located in the Ukraine the population soon became aware of the conditions in them, even though a substantial portion of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were separated out and released by the Germans.[59] Moreover, the inhabitants could scarcely avoid noticing the corpses of prisoners of war shot (perhaps as "kommissars" or Communists) and left lying in the villages.[60] Consequently, a belief that the Germans intended to destroy the Slavic peoples soon became widespread.

A second German failure was less shocking than the treatment of the prisoners of war, but in the long run it had an even more deleterious effect on relations with the Ukrainian population. This was the policy in relation to agriculture. As was noted previously, the major objective of the Nazi leadership in its occupation of the Ukraine was the acquisition of food and raw materials to increase Germany's war potential. This objective involved the necessity of dealing with the question of the kolkhoz, which was the predominant form of agricultural organization in the Soviet Union.

The problem posed for the German occupiers was not an easy one by any standards. It will be recalled that the chief reason for the introduction of the kolkhoz by Moscow was the prevalence of the "scissors crisis" during the late twenties; this emergency arose fundamentally because the Soviet rulers were unable or unwilling to supply enough consumer goods to induce individual peasants to deliver large quantities of agricultural products. The Germans were faced with the same dilemma, because the needs of their

[58] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2.

[59] Interview 51; Directive of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Abteilung Kriegsgefangene, June 16, 1941, PS 888 (hereafter referred to as PS 888); *Nastup*, July 12, 1941, p. 2; Amt Ausland Abwehr to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Annex, September 15, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 338 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 338).

[60] Memorandum by First Lieutenant Oberländer, Abwehr II, Heeresgruppe Süd, November 28, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 278 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 278). Oberländer significantly points out that pro-German sentiment in the population had greatly diminished within a few weeks of conquest—i.e., while the Wehrmacht was still the occupying authority.

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fighting forces required that very little production be diverted to consumer goods. Moreover, their situation was in many respects more difficult than that of the Kremlin in 1929, for the material basis for the reconstruction of individual farms—buildings, equipment, livestock—was often lacking. Under these circumstances, a return to individual operation of agriculture would probably have meant a sharp net decline in productivity and a still greater decline in surpluses available for delivery.

On the other hand, the Germans had strong reasons for favoring the dissolution of the collective-farm system, as a salient feature of the Soviet system which they affected to despise. More than any other aspect of the Soviet system, the kolkhoz appears to have been hated by large numbers of the peasants. While it is questionable whether this hatred was universally felt, it was undoubtedly a very strong sentiment among the older groups of the population, those most ready on other grounds to cooperate with the Germans.[61]

Faced with this dilemma, the German rulers followed a tactic of compromise and deceit. They promised to dissolve the kolkhoz, stipulating reasonably enough, but in opposition to the desire of the peasant for immediate acquisition of land, that the process be gradual. First, the kolkhoz was to be transformed into a *Gemeinwirtschaft* (*hromads'ke hospodarstvo*) or community enterprise; the only signficant immediate effect was the increase in the *dvor* or garden allotment permitted each household. In a second stage, to follow in the near future, the *Gemeinwirtschaft* was to be transformed into a *Landbaugenossenschaft* (*khliborobs'ka spilka*) or agricultural association. At this stage each household was to receive a definite section of land, and be rewarded in proportion to the harvest from this land, although many of the major agricultural operations were to be performed in common to overcome the extreme dearth of draft animals, tractors, tractor fuel, and implements.[62]

Where the program was carried out without proscrastination,

[61] PS 3876.

[62] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, February 28, 1942, p. 3. A final stage, the *Einzelhof*, or individual farm, was envisaged by the planners, but very rarely, if ever, instituted.

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most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd Ic, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

Army which was being organized in the territory of the Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

The internal policy of the new Government, completely at the service of the forces of occupation, was characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central Powers came into Ukraine. 728

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrainian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution: 669 665

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. *The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)*

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia. 185 423

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discontent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The representatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council. [563] 727 565

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
652 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
● [423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist
[191] dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Co[illegible]ress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933:

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation.

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
● 423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
474 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[2. In ... Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation ●423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the [511] Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus- 186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

/141/ Hunger Overcomes Resistance

178 Bolshevism tore the Ukrainians away from their past and hurled them, as it were, into a dark, unknown future. They were thrown from one extreme into the other, not only with regard to religion, but also in a social, economic and political respect. They were thrown from unlimited individualism into a society where all are supposed to be equal.

When Bolshevik slogans spread through the Ukrainian villages there was a great deal that was ripe for oblivion. Czarist Moscow, the great princes of the Church and the wealthy gentry had exerted themselves precisely to keep the populace in a state of ignorance and to prevent any kind of enlightenment. The masses were thus more tractable and the existing order was not endangered. Nevertheless, with thrift and industry the peasants had succeeded in considerably enlarging their land after serfdom was abolished in 1861, to the detriment of the landed proprietors. In 1861 the peasants owned 45.7% of 48.1 million hectares, in 1916 they owned 65%. (84) The rest was the property of the lords of the manor, the church and the state.

423 [162]

84. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 360.

423 241 With the rapid increase in population there was a great land shortage, especially in North Ukraine, even after the distribution of land in 1861. Conditions had not improved much since 1830, when the representative of the nobility of the Poltava district reported in the Senate that in his district "there was a perceptible shortage of land and dire poverty". (85) In Podolia,

85. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of South Ukraine, page 32.

423 Volhynia, and in the northern guberniyas more than
241 half the land belonged to large estates before the First World War, and the rest was divided among the small /142/ farmers with many children, who barely earned a laborer's living. Since the small farmers could not live from the yield of their one- to four-hectare fields, they tried to supplement their income by doing other work. They hired themselves out as day laborers to the estates and rented land from the lords of the manor - in the part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the river especially from Jews who, for their part, were tenants on a large scale - for a wickedly high rent.

In the South Ukrainian steppe, which was not settled until late, conditions were different. This steppe occupies about three-sevenths of the surface of present-day Soviet Ukraine. When Catherine II had cleared the steppe of Crimean Tatars and the Caucasian peoples, she sent for foreign colonists, especially Germans to settle the land. The influx of settlers from all sides was so great that in some parts there was a shortage of land even at the beginning of the 19th century, and the descendants of the first settlers were in turn, obliged to emigrate in the middle
241 of the century. But in general there was enough land. Steppe farming which was once pasture farming, underwent a basic transformation. Since grain was well paid, the farmers and estate owners turned the scar of the steppes into arable land; thus what was once rich pastureland became in the end, poor pastureland. In terms of territory, no less than 75 to 90% of the entire soil was arable, so that there was a shortage of feed for the draft animals. People were forced to limit the number of oxen and horses they kept and return to extensive farming, plowing the soil with four light horses and a light plow, rather than with eight heavy oxen and a heavy plow.

425 669 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

423 241 The New Economic Policy with its tolerance of a "bludgeoned private economy" constituted the second chapter. The peasants obtained their land and their farms on long leases; they could cultivate their land as they pleased, except that the farm could not be carelessly run, otherwise the management of the establishment could pass over into other hands. Nothing was gained by the fact that all the land belonged to the community. The "communal fields" were a Russian form of possession which had found favor at the time of Catherine II in the steppes and in the part of the Ukraine on the left bank of the river. Even though the farmer could not dispose of his land 497 at any time like a free /Facing page 144/ /Map IX: Railroad Communications. The main lines of communication run in a north-south direction, whereas the east-west lines have always been neglected./ /Key: Number of daily passenger trains 423 241 in 1935././145/ estate owner, even though he was obliged to acquiesce to the fact that the entire community property was redistributed every 10 to 20 years, nevertheless, he could do as he pleased on his section of land. No less than 88.9% of peasant land in the Ukrainian steppes belonged to the communities, and in North Ukraine, 80.4%. The czars had condoned this form of ownership, because it simplified administration, facilitated

423 241 tax collection and, finally, also corresponded to the patriarchal order. It was only in the former Polish Ukraine on the right side of the river that purely private ownership was retained. The Bolshevik NEP now very cleverly fastened on to the community field system.

241 With the restoration of peace and order during the NEP years the social life of the peasant country again attained its equilibrium. The families which before that were broken up or dismembered now came together again. At the same time, great efforts were made to raise the productive capacity of the new family farms by means of technical education, and in this the young farmers were particularly eager to join. At that time, a German observer wrote: "In the activity of the youth organizations in the villages we see an expression of the deep longing to be freed at last from 'the power of darkness' and not always to stand apart while the civilized races divide up the treasures of the earth among themselves." (88)

88. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of the South Ukraine, page 69.

423 241 474 185 This hopeful development was abruptly interrupted by the subsequent third phase of the agrarian revolution, the transfer of the individual peasant farm to communal ownership of all village inhabitants. It was only by means of collectivism, the coordination of the farms with the communes in the other economic fields, that the Bolshevik regime could last; it was only in this way that one could strike at the root of Ukrainian nationalism, and only thus carry out the Five Year Plan. For industrial development with the purchase of foreign /146/ machines had to be paid for by exporting agricultural products. All that was needed now was a command, in order to maintain the export of the necessary amounts of grain at the prescribed price.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 474 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

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V

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

Ukrainians and Byelorussians are officially recognized as independent nations within the U.S.S.R., yet not in the same sense as Armenians, Georgians or the peoples of Central Asia. Nominally the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other peoples having Soviet Republics of their own are put on an equal footing, but in reality the Kremlin adheres to the idea of a Russian super-nation comprising Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians. This Russian super-nation makes up almost four-fifths of the population of the U.S.S.R. and is thus largely identical with the Soviet Union.

S.U. 563 635 829

The Soviet régime which has always been eager to exaggerate the importance of the cleavage between various branches of the family of Finnish or Turkic peoples is equally anxious to minimize the differences existing between Slavs. This apparent contradiction in approach is easily explained. Finnish and Turkic unity favours disintegration but Slav unity makes for the consolidation and the strengthening of the Soviet State.

S.U. 182

The dominant Soviet conception of history classes Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians as 'three brotherly peoples' who after the twelfth century developed out of a formerly existing single Russian people. The Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians, according to official Soviet history, were still united in the ancient Slav State of Kiev and went their separate ways only after Kiev's downfall.

S.U. 814 829

I. THE UKRAINE

The Ukrainians are the most numerous people of the Soviet Union apart from the Great Russians.

UK. 423

Their land is both the most important industrial arsenal and the largest granary of Russia. Before the Second World War it supplied more than half Russia's coal, 60 per cent of her iron ore and cast iron, 50 per cent of all steel, 70 per cent of all sugar beet and 40 per cent of all winter-wheat. These facts in themselves determine the importance of the Ukrainian factor in the general planning of Soviet Russian policy.

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

661 668 423

Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665

The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, p.p. 130-131 -- Analyst]
[2] [Cf. cat. 642, p 128 -- Analyst 132]